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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between financial performance and ethical screening 
intensity of a special class of ethical funds that is rooted in Islamic values – Islamic equity funds 
(IEFs). These faith-based ethical funds screen investments on compliance with Islamic values 
where conventional interest expense (riba), gambling (maysir), excessive uncertainty (gharar), and 
non-ethical (non-halal) products are prohibited. We test whether these extra screens affect the 
financial performance of IEFs relative to non-Islamic funds. Based on a large survivorship-free 
international sample of 387 Islamic funds, our results show that IEFs on average underperform 
conventional funds by 40 basis points per month, or 4.8% per year (supporting the 
underperformance hypothesis). While Islamic funds do not generally perform better during crisis 
periods, they outperformed conventional funds during the recent sub-prime crisis (supporting 
the outperformance hypothesis). Using holdings-based measures for ethical screening intensity, results 
show IEFs that apply more intensive screening perform worse, suggesting that there is a cost to 
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1. Introduction 
1 Over the last two decades, ethical investments  or more broadly socially responsible 
investments (SRIs) have become a major stream within the funds management industry. Besides 
financial characteristics (risk and return), this investment vehicle integrates certain philosophical 
beliefs such as those pertaining to social, environmental, governance, and religious matters into 
the investment decision making process. The most controversial issue about this investment 
approach is whether such an ethical overlay adversely affects fund financial performance. While a 
number of important papers have examined the relationship between ethical screening and 
financial performance (Margolis et al., 2007; Renneboog et al., 2008a), much uncertainty remains 
about the significance of this relationship. 
 In this paper, we shed further light on the association between ethical screening and 
financial performance by examining a special class of ethical funds that is rooted in Islamic 
values – Islamic equity funds (IEFs). While the investment guidelines of IEFs are for the most 
part consistent with those of SRIs, both in their approach and objective in terms of mandating 
social values and good governance, Islamic finance is an entire financial system in its own right 
targeting predominantly believers in the Islamic faith (Muslims). 
 Our research is partly motivated by the growth of Islamic finance. While the first IEF, 
Dana Al-Aiman managed by Mura Unit Trust, was established as early as 1968 in Malaysia, it was 
not until the early 1990s that equity investment was officially approved by the Council of the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy (CIFA) (Ayub, 2007). Spurred by the spectacular rise in petro-dollar 
revenues in oil-rich Muslim countries, recent years have witnessed Islamic finance as one of the 
fastest growing finance sectors globally (Al-Salem, 2008). Total assets under management 
(AUM), excluding capital appreciation, of IEFs have grown at an annual rate of more than 15%, 
three times that of conventional funds. Currently, there are more than 400 IEFs under 
                                                            
1 Other commonly used terms for ethical investments include “green”, “sustainable”, “socially responsible”, and 
“religious” investments. These are all different names for what is collectively known as “socially responsible 
investments” (SRIs). 
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management globally (www.eurekahedge.com). With more than US$25bn AUM, a large, 
expanding and untapped Muslim population, and a growing interest from both Muslim and non-
Muslims alike, the importance of research into the financial performance of IEFs is immediately 
apparent.  
 Drawing on modern portfolio theory, we test whether the ethical screens employed by 
IEFs, and the resulting smaller investment opportunity set, adversely affect their performance 
(the underperformance hypothesis). Conversely, the act of ethical screening in itself suggests that IEFs 
may perform better than conventional funds (the outperformance hypothesis) as fund managers are 
more careful in selecting firms than their conventional counterparts. Further, by prohibiting 
investment in high leverage firms, conventional banks, and speculative financial transactions, 
IEFs may be more insulated from market downturns (e.g. financial crises), as is often publicized 
by the media.2 However, contrary to these opposing hypotheses, much of the literature finds no 
strong evidence of performance differences between conventional and SRI funds (Kreander et 
al., 2005; Mallin et al., 1995; Renneboog et al., 2008b). Explanations provided are based on the 
convergence hypothesis: (i) conventional funds are becoming more like ethical funds where 
both ethical and conventional funds invest in ethical firms; or (ii) ethical funds are becoming 
more like conventional funds, where ethical funds do not comply with their ethical screens; the 
former argument is less likely to hold for Islamic funds due to the distinctive screens they 
employ, as we explain later. 
 Based on a sample of 387 IEFs domiciled in 32 countries with investments in 11 regions 
over the period January 1984 to March 2010,3 we find IEFs underperform conventional and SRI 
funds by an average of 40 and 30 basis points per month respectively (the underperformance 
hypothesis), suggesting that investors pay a rather hefty cost for their Islamic faith. During the 
recent sub-prime crisis, however, IEFs outperformed (by 60 basis points per month) 
                                                            
2 See for example: http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-9910749/In-credit-crisis-Islamic-funds.html. 
3 We note that only 9% of Renneboog et al.’s (2008b) sample of 440 SRI funds apply Islamic screens, i.e. they are 
IEFs. 
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conventional funds (the outperformance hypothesis) due perhaps to the minimum exposure that IEFs 
have to conventional banks and highly leveraged firms, both of which suffered more than other 
firms during the crisis. Employing the Fama & French three-factor model, IEFs tend to invest in 
lower beta, higher growth, and larger stocks than conventional funds. The Carhart model shows 
no difference in momentum strategy between IEFs and other funds. On the Islamic compliance 
factors, IEFs load heavier on the more stringent MSCI Islamic than other benchmarks, as 
expected.  
Next, we examine the relationship between ethical screening intensity and fund 
performance. We employ three screening intensity measures. The first, derived from Sharpe’s 
style analysis, is the factor loading on the return difference between MSCI Islamic and MSCI AC 
conventional index and between MSCI Islamic and DJ Islamic index. We find the (MSCI Islamic – 
MSCI AC) factor is negatively related to Islamic fund performance only when the latter is 
measured relative to religious funds. In contrast, the (MSCI Islamic – DJ Islamic) factor is 
positively related to Islamic fund performance only when benchmarked against conventional 
funds. Our second measure is based on fund disclosure (in the prospectus) on the type and 
number of ethical screens employed. The results show no significant relationship between the 
number of accounting screens employed and IEF performance although there is some evidence 
of a curvilinear relationship when IEF performance is measured relative to religious funds. 
Renneboog et al. (2008b) too find little evidence that screening intensity, proxied by the number 
of accounting screens used, explains SRI performance. . Our final measure applies the ethical 
screening filter of MSCI Islamic to fund holdings data: funds with a higher proportion of holdings 
passing this filter are considered to engage in more intense screening. We find a negative 
relationship between this measure of screening intensity and IEF performance relative to other 
funds. IEFs with more intense screening perform worse, supporting the underperformance hypothesis.   
Younger and larger funds have higher risk-adjusted performance, in line with the extant 
literature (e.g. Capelle-Blancard and Monjon, 2010; Renneboog et al., 2008b). Funds managed by 
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Islamic investment companies also perform better. While differences in management fee do not 
explain cross-sectional differences in IEF performance, funds that charge higher purification 
(non-compliance) fees4 perform worse.   
For robustness, we compare the performance of Islamic indexes with matched (on region) 
conventional, SRI, and religious indexes. Results show that Islamic indexes underperformed the 
conventional, SRI, and religious benchmarks during the 2000.dotcom crisis but outperformed 
them during the GFC. However, compared to the fund-level results, the outperformance of 
Islamic indexes is economically much smaller, about 23 basis points per month or 2.8% per year. 
There is also a negative (curvilinear) relationship between the aggregate Islamic fund 
performance and the number of accounting screens. Further, employing the stricter accounting 
screen of the one-third threshold reduces the Islamic index performance (by 50 basis points per 
month), and so do purification fees. Finally, while the relationship between ethical screening 
intensity and fund performance relative to other conventional funds is mixed, we find a negative 
relationship between ethical screening intensity and the performance of Islamic funds relative to 
other SRI and religious funds.    
Our research contributes to the literature in the following important ways. First, we 
provide the first global survivorship-free analysis of an important group of ethical funds, Islamic 
funds, over an extended time period. Our findings thus add to the relatively lean literature on 
Islamic finance, 5 specifically, and the ethical funds literature, in general, on whether ethical 
screening affects fund performance. Second, while some studies (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; 
Capelle-Blancard and Monjon, 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Renneboog et al., 2008b) examine the 
impact of the type and number of ethical screens on fund performance, we are able to more 
                                                            
4 Purification fee is the donation of impure (prohibited) profits from investment to the poor. 
5 While there are numerous studies on the performance of SRIs (Renneboog et al., 2008a), studies on IEF 
performance are scarce due mainly to the small number of such funds existing up until recently. Of the few studies 
that examine the performance of Islamic funds, most focus on either a very small sample over a very short time 
period or Islamic equity indexes rather than the funds themselves (Abderrezak, 2008; Abdullah et al., 2007; 
Elfakhani and Hassan, 2005; Hayat, 2006; Muhammad and Mokhtar, 2008; Wilson, 2002). Not surprising, these 
studies produce largely mixed results on the performance of IEFs relative to conventional funds. 
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precisely calibrate ethical screening intensity of funds and relate it to fund performance. Research 
into IEFs is expected to yield more robust results on the impact of an ethical overlay on financial 
performance compared to the broader class of SRIs because the screens employed by IEFs are 
predominantly exclusionary in nature, employing both business activity and accounting screens, 
and are therefore more easily calibrated. In comparison, there is wide heterogeneity in the 
motivations and attitudes of the various SRIs, employing a wide range of often very vague 
screening standards and ranking criteria to include/exclude firms (Derwall et al., 2011; Sandberg 
et al., 2008). Our paper is also the first to examine the impact of purification fees, unique to our 
sample of ethical funds, on fund performance. 
 Our contribution also lies in the methodology. We compare the relative performance of 
IEFs to non-IEFs (conventional, SRI, and religious funds) by constructing difference portfolios. 
This is defined as the difference in the returns between IEFs and non-IEFs of similar 
characteristics. This method provides us with a more reliable measure of the incremental 
difference in performance between IEFs and other funds. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the investment 
philosophy of Islamic funds. Research hypotheses are provided in Section 3. Data and research 
methods are outlined in Section 4, and Section 5 provides the empirical results. A summary of 
the major findings and conclusions are given in Section 6.  
 
2. Islamic principles of investing 
The core principles of Islamic investing are bound by the ethical and moral framework of 
6Sharī‘ah law.  Islamic financial transactions are based on a concern for ethically and socially 
responsible activities and at the same time prohibit involvement in activities which are 
detrimental to social and environmental well-being. All forms of business exploitation are 
                                                            
6 We use the terms Sharī‘ah and Islamic interchangeably in this paper to mean the moral code and religious law of 
Islam. 
6 
 
prohibited in Islamic finance, where profits and risk are shared equally between parties to a 
transaction.  
Equity investment is permissible under the Sharī‘ah law because investors and firms share 
not only the profits but also the risk. However, equity is permissible only if the firm engages 
strictly in the permissible (halal) and abstains from the prohibited (haram), as commanded by 
God; the latter comprises (i) riba (payment over and above what has been lent, translated by 
Islamic scholars today as being equivalent to interest);  (ii) maysir (gambling);7 8 (iii) gharar 
(excessive uncertainty);9 and (iv) non-halal (socially detrimental) businesses including alcohol, 
tobacco, pork-related products, conventional financial services, defense and weapons, gambling 
and casino, music, hotels, cinemas, and adult entertainment.  
Although IEFs are not known to employ inclusionary screens where certain businesses are 
explicitly sought out, one exception is Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) which are strictly run 
according to Sharī‘ah principles. Because of the ban on interest payments, Islamic funds employ 
the following financial ratios to screen out firms that carry high amounts of debt or reap 
significant income from interest payments: (i) total debt to total assets/equity; and (ii) cash and 
short term investments to total assets/equity. Firms are also screened on liquid assets (accounts 
receivable) to total assets/equity ratio to ensure that they are not in majority composed of liquid 
assets.10 The threshold value used in the financial ratios, while not stated explicitly in Islamic law, 
                                                            
7 The charging or receiving of interest gives rise to an unequal distribution of risk between the lender and the 
borrower; the fact that the lender charges an interest but does not share the loss with the borrower is viewed as 
exploiting the borrower. In Islamic finance, any return on money invested should be linked to the profits of an 
enterprise. 
8 Maysir includes financial transactions that are based on dishonesty/ambiguity/ignorance regarding materials or 
price, such as betting using futures.    
9 Gharar (uncertainty) is deception which involves putting one’s assets or self in excessive risk. Islam prohibits all 
kinds of speculative behavior that is embedded in most conventional funds. Hence, short selling stocks by selling 
borrowed shares to bet their price will drop are not allowed as these represent an unacceptable form of speculation. 
10 In Islam, liquid assets can only be traded at par. Therefore the value of the company can only be negotiable if it 
has illiquid (real) assets.   
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11varies between 30% and 45%.  The denominator of the financial ratios, which is meant to 
represent the total value of the firm, is either total assets or market capitalization.  
While Islamic funds may engage in leverage through the use of Islamic financing 
instruments (Sukuk), they may not obtain or provide conventional loans or otherwise invest in 
conventional interest-bearing instruments, including convertible debt securities. Cash held by a 
fund may only be invested in Sharī‘ah-compliant short-term investment products such as Islamic 
money market instruments. As Sharī‘ah prohibits the payment of any predetermined guaranteed 
rate of return, investments in preferred shares or fixed income securities are also restricted. 
Islamic funds should not involve in excessive risk through speculative transactions such as short 
selling12 and market timing.  
Unlike other ethical investments, the Islamic investment process includes “purification”, 
which is a donation of impure (haram) profits to the poor (Derigs and Marzban, 2008; Wilson, 
 firms in 131997). The purification fee is in response to the absence of fully Sharī‘ah-compliant
the world. The collective opinion of Islamic scholars is to allow investments in stocks with a 
tolerable proportion of revenues from prohibited activities, usually set at 5% to 10% of total 
revenue (Ayub, 2007; Derigs and Marzban, 2008; Securities Commission Malaysia, 2007). Any 
excess impure income is subject to purification. 
Finally, to ensure that fund managers comply with the screening rules, most IEFs 
establish/appoint a Sharī‘ah Advisory Board (SAB). The board consists of qualified and 
experienced Islamic scholars who direct, monitor, and supervise the fund’s activities to ensure 
                                                            
11 This is the direct result of the various interpretations by Sharī‘ah scholars: “Judgement is based on majority, not on 
minority,” and “the dividing line between a majority and minority is one third, and the third as a portion is considered to be much” 
(Hadith).  
12 Selling short appears to run contrary to the Qu’ran, which prohibits the sale of what you do not own. Mohamad 
Toufic Kanafani, chief executive of Noriba, the Islamic banking arm of UBS Warburg and project adviser, says the 
team developed ways around this by imposing a down payment (Salam transaction) towards each transaction, which 
must be stated clearly in writing (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16a71f48-1b21-11d9-9fe400000e2511c8. 
html#axzz2B9oHIvBn). 
13 By “Sharī‘ah-compliant”, we mean that the investment passes the ethical screens of the fund and not that the 
firm is operating according to Islamic law. 
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that management follows the provisions and principles of Sharī‘ah in the fund’s operation and 
transactions. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
The extant SRI performance literature examines three hypotheses: (1) the underperformance 
hypothesis; (2) the outperformance hypothesis; and (3) the no difference hypothesis.  
The underperformance hypothesis is premised on modern portfolio theory and argues that 
ethical screens shrink the investment universe, thus producing a mean-variance efficient frontier 
that is significantly less optimal than if the screens were absent. In the case of IEFs, the extensive 
business and accounting screens have been shown to reduce the eligible investment universe by 
up to 50% on average (Nainggolan et al., 2012), far more than for SRI funds which tend to focus 
on only environmental, social, and governance (ESG) principles. Given a level of total risk, this 
would limit the ability of IEFs to match the return on funds that are not constrained by similar 
screens. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) also argue there is a societal norm against funding 
operations that promote vice and that some investors, particularly institutions subject to these 
norms, pay a financial cost in abstaining from these stocks. It follows that ethical factors affect 
stock prices, with sin stocks offering higher expected returns than other comparable stocks, 
consistent with them being neglected.  
There are several other compelling arguments for the underperformance hypothesis in the 
case of IEFs. First, the number of securities eliminated through the integration of Islamic 
considerations is large – as investment strategies become more restrictive, opportunities to 
profit become even fewer. For one, IEFs must sit on the sideline when the market sentiment 
shifts to an industry they have excluded, unable to profit from the industry. For conventional 
funds, as there is no reason to do the same, they do not miss out on the opportunity afforded by 
the cyclical nature of financial markets. Sharī‘ah law also prohibits short selling, margin trading, 
and excessive speculation – assuming investment managers are skilled, all these limit the 
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opportunities for IEFs to match the returns of funds that do not operate under such 
constraints.  
Another argument is based on differences in the cost structure between IEFs and other 
funds. For example, while conventional fund managers have only one overall goal – to achieve 
the highest possible return for a specific level of risk – ethical fund managers must also ensure 
that the businesses they invest in comply with the fund’s chosen ethical values. To cover the 
costs associated with stock screening and monitoring, including the cost incurred in setting up 
and financing a SAB, IEFs are expected to charge higher management costs.14 The net return to 
IEF investors are further reduced since IEFs are compelled to sell stocks that exceed certain 
threshold of financial ratios irrespective of performance. Unlike other ethical funds, including 
religious ones, IEFs are also required to pay purification fees on any impure income received. 
Since the negative impact of ethical screening on fund performance is expected to be 
exacerbated in funds that employ more demanding ethical screens (Derigs and Marzban, 2009), 
we expect IEFs to exhibit the worst performance of all equity funds. It therefore follows that 
the relationship between the intensity of ethical screening and fund performance is a negative 
one. All the above arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Islamic equity funds on average perform worse than other equity funds. 
H1b: There is a negative relationship between ethical screening intensity and fund       
        performance. 
Conversely, the outperformance hypothesis predicts that ethical funds outperform conventional 
funds in the long run because financial markets undervalue corporate social responsibility in the 
short run (Renneboog et al., 2008b). The first rationale is that there is always a consequence for 
every action. Short-sighted, profit-above-all-else-focused businesses create avoidable risks and 
ignore vital risk indicators that a socially responsible firm would otherwise embrace. Such firms 
                                                            
14 These costs can be as high as 2% of the net asset value. 
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are likely to perform worse during corporate social crises or environmental disasters as they run 
the risk of incurring levies and legal costs to compensate or make good any damages caused by 
their (socially irresponsible) actions. Second, ethical principles provide a source of competitive 
advantage in situations where consumers favor firms with high ethical standards (Porter and 
Kramer, 2006). Also, sound social and environmental performance may signal high managerial 
quality and reputation which will affect the profit of such firms (Renneboog et al., 2008b). As 
per the “error-in-expectations hypothesis”, it is possible that mainstream investors have 
systematically overlooked this ethical factor (Derwall et al., 2011). Insofar as investors in ethical 
funds are expected to be more loyal, there may also be cost efficiencies arising from reduced 
fund turnover and associated transaction costs. Therefore, according to the outperformance 
hypothesis, IEFs, with their highest screening intensity, exhibit the best performance relative to 
conventional and all other ethical funds: 
H2a: Islamic equity funds on average perform better than other equity funds.   
H2b: There is a positive relationship between ethical screening intensity and fund   
        performance. 
The ethical screening process unique only to Islamic funds suggests that the 
outperformance hypothesis is expected to be more strongly supported during crisis periods. 
First, the prohibition of investments in firms with large amounts of conventional debt on their 
balance sheet should keep IEFs relatively safe from the credit crunch that rocked many 
mainstream mutual funds (Ahmed, 2010). To exemplify this, prior to their bankruptcy, 
WorldCom, Enron, Tyco, and other distressed US firms were excluded from DJ Islamic World 
index because they did not pass the Sharī‘ah accounting screens (Hussein and Omran, 2005). 
High leverage makes companies’ earnings and therefore stock price more volatile (known as the 
“leverage effect’), thus increasing their susceptibility to market downturns.  Second, IEFs are 
prohibited from short selling, trading in conventional debt instruments, and complex financial 
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instruments such as collaterized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDS). All 
these activities are thought to have contributed to the sub-prime crisis. Hence, Islamic screening 
factors are prime candidates for fundamental factors that provide protection against market 
downturns. Finally, Islamic finance is built on profit and risk sharing of economic transactions. 
This feature requires the Islamic financial system to have a high level of disclosure and 
transparency to allow financial markets to price firms appropriately (Ahmed, 2010). The built-in 
checks and balances improve the market discipline to take effect to promote the Islamic finance 
system financial stability (Ahmed, 2010). Since IEFs invest mostly in IFIs which have a stronger 
governance system than conventional financial institutions, they may well be less affected by the 
crisis.  
H2c: Islamic equity funds on average perform better than other equity funds, particularly 
       during financial crises.   
The no difference (or convergence) hypothesis predicts that ethical funds perform similarly to 
conventional funds (e.g. Kreander et al., 2005; Mallin et al., 1995; Renneboog et al., 2008a). 
Under this view, the extra screens imposed on funds are not expected to affect performance for 
a number of reasons. First, it may be the case that all funds invest in highly ethical firms with 
positive net present value (Renneboog et al., 2008a). In other words, conventional funds have 
become more ethical and are practically indistinguishable from ethical funds. Second, if ethical 
investors are unwilling to sacrifice returns for their moral philosophy, ethical funds may become 
more lax on (or steer away from) their screening making them more like conventional funds. 
Third, in efficient markets, funds cannot outperform their benchmarks based on public 
information, such as ethical criteria, because conventional fund managers can replicate the 
screens. This results in no difference in performance between these fund types (Renneboog et 
al., 2008a). Additionally, ethical screening may not affect fund performance if the screens do not 
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contain superior information. Any superior return to ethical factors may vanish once additional 
screening costs are taken into account. Therefore: 
H3a: Islamic equity funds on average perform no differently from other equity funds. 
H3b: There is no relationship between ethical screening intensity and fund performance.          
 
4. Data and research methods 
4.1  Data 
We construct a comprehensive database of IEFs using data extracted from various sources 
including Morningstar Direct, Eurekahedge Global Islamic Funds, Bloomberg, the fund’s website, and 
annual reports. We collect data on fund name, type, inception date, country of domicile, regional 
orientation (investment universe), monthly returns, total assets under management (in USD 
million), management fees, benchmark returns, and holdings as at March 2010. Data on 
purification fees (the fund’s non-compliant income over net assets), type and number of 
accounting screens employed, and whether the fund is managed by an Islamic investment 
company, are all extracted from fund prospectuses and annual reports. All monthly returns are 
expressed in local currency and percentage terms, and adjusted for capital gain distributions, 
management fees, and purification fees but before dividend distributions and sales charges. This 
is because not all databases provide data on total returns after dividend distributions and we 
want to have a consistent measure of returns across the sample funds irrespective of the data 
source. 
Our initial sample consists of 496 IEFs, of which 277 are obtained from Morningstar Direct, 
188 from Eurekahedge Global Islamic Funds, and 31 from Bloomberg. Excluding funds with no 
historical return data results in a final sample of 387 IEFs domiciled in 32 countries with 
investments in 11 regions from January 1984 to March 2010. The data are free of survivorship-
bias since Morningstar Direct and Eurekahedge Global Islamic Funds provide coverage of both live and 
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dead funds. There are 330 live and 57 dead IEFs in the final sample. To our knowledge, this 
makes our study the first large scale survivorship free analysis of Islamic funds around the world.  
We match each of the 387 IEFs with 59,286 conventional equity funds (CEFs), 1,744 SRI 
equity funds, and 49 religious (Christian/Catholic) equity funds (REFs) by country of domicile, 
regional orientation (investment universe), size, and age. This matching procedure is similar to 
that in Kreander et al. (2005) and Mallin et al. (1995). Because of our matching procedure, each 
control fund can be selected repeatedly. There are 220 CEFs, 201 SRIs, and 28 REFs that are 
uniquely matched with our sample IEFs. 
Table 1 provides the frequency distribution and profile of our sample IEFs by country of 
domicile and regional orientation. Muslim countries contribute about half (220) of the sample, 
mostly Malaysia (83), followed by Saudi Arabia (36) and United Arab Emirates (33). Luxemburg 
(54) has the second largest number of Islamic funds due mainly to their tax waiver policy for 
profits on ethical funds. About a quarter (98) of our sample funds invest globally. Twenty two 
percent (85) have an orientation towards the Muslim region, i.e., Gulf Cooperation Council and 
Middle East North Africa (GCC&MENA),15 and 21% (83) have a domestic orientation, 
predominantly Malaysia. 
The mean (median) fund size is relatively small at USD70 million (USD17 million). IEFs 
domiciled in the United States are the largest (USD409 million), followed by the United Arab 
Emirates (USD206 million) and Saudi Arabia (USD72 million). The largest fund is Saudi British 
Bank (SABB) Amanah Saudi Equity Fund with AUM of USD2453 million, domiciled in United 
Arab Emirates, invests in GCC and MENA region, and has been in operation for only about 6 
years. Funds invest in GCC&MENA are significantly (at the 5% level) larger than those invest in 
other regions. The average (median) age of our sample Islamic funds is 67 months (47 months), 
with the older ones mostly domiciled in Muslim countries (significant at the 1% level).  However, 
funds invest in Muslim region are younger than those invest in non-Muslim regions. The oldest 
                                                            
15 More than 50% of the world population of Muslims lives in this region (Pew Research Center, 2009).  
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fund at 41 years is Amanah Saham Mara (ASM) Dana Al-Aiman, which is domiciled in Malaysia, 
invests only domestically, and has AUM of USD22 million.  
The average (median) fund management fee is 1.61% (1.50%). Funds domiciled in the 
United States charge the lowest fees, with funds domiciled in non-Muslim countries charging 
significantly lower fees by 0.19% than those domiciled in Muslim countries. The average 
reported fund purification fee is 0.04%, which is rather small, implying that funds have low 
exposure to prohibited income. Funds domiciled in Ireland and invest globally charge the highest 
purification fee (0.67% and 0.13% respectively). However, there is no significant difference in 
purification fees between funds domiciled (invest) in Muslim and non-Muslim countries 
(regions). A large majority of Islamic funds are managed by diversified investment companies 
with only 18% managed by pure Islamic investment companies. On average funds domiciled in 
Muslim countries are more likely to be managed by pure Islamic investment companies than 
those in non-Muslim countries.  
 
4.2  Fund performance measurement 
To examine the investment performance of IEFs relative to other types of equity funds, we 
form ffer or lios a omput  their equally-weighted returns (ܴாௐௗ ) as follows: di ence (d) p tfo nd c e
ܴாௐௗ ൌ  ݓ௜  ∑ ൫ܴூாி,௜ െ ܴெ௔௧௖௛,௜൯
ே
௜ୀଵ ,       (1)             
IEFR MatchRwhere  and  are the returns on the IEF and its matched non-IEF fund respectively, 
and ݓ=1/N. We do this for the full sample as well for each domicile and regional orientation. 
The returns are net of management16 and purification fees. The fund’s monthly raw return ( ) 
is computed as: 
tR
[ 1/ −= ttt NAVNAVLnR ]
                                                           
,         (2) 
 
16 Although not reported in details in this paper, using the fund returns before-management fee does not change 
our conclusion. 
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where  is the fund’s net asset value at time t.  tNAV
Since differences in performance may (to a large degree) be explained by differences in 
systematic risk, we compute the risk-adjusted returns using commonly used single- and multi-
factor asset pricing models. Our first performance measure is Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1968), 
obtained by regressing the series of portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate (Rf) against 
market returns in excess of the risk-free rate (Sharpe, 1964): 
 ሺௗሻ௘ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߚெܴெ,௧௘ ൅ ߝଵ,௧,               (3) ܴ௧
where ܴ௧
ሺௗሻ௘
  is the excess return on the (difference) portfolio; ߙଵ is Jensen’s alpha; ܴெ௘  denotes 
the excess return on the market portfolio; ߚெ  denotes the systematic risk of the portfolio; and ε  
is that part of the portfolio’s excess return that is not captured by the first two terms. The 
variance of ε  is the unsystematic risk of the portfolio. Assuming the world is fully integrated and 
examining fund performance from an international perspective, we use the MSCI AC (All 
Countries) World as our global market benchmark portfolio. Our choice is motivated by several 
studies which find the MSCI AC World index is a mean-variance efficient benchmark (Chou and 
Lin, 2002; Cumby and Glen, 1990). The excess return on the benchmark portfolio is computed 
using the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate as our proxy for the risk-free rate.17  
To alleviate concerns about the market portfolio as the only systematic risk factor, we also 
employ Fama and French’s (1996) three-factor model where both size and value factors affect 
the ris -return relationship: k
ܴሺௗሻ௘ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ߚெܴெ,௧௘ ൅  ߚ௏ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚௌܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߝଶ,௧,              (4) ௧
where ܪܯܮ is the excess return on the mimicking portfolio for the high minus low value (book-
to-market) factor and ܵܯܤ is the excess return on the mimicking portfolio for the small minus 
big size (market capitalization) factor. Following Faff (2003), we compute these factors using 
combinations of portfolios composed of four of the MSCI AC World style indexes: MSCI AC 
                                                            
17 We consider alternatives proxies for the non-interest bearing risk-free rate of return within the Islamic context, 
such as a 2.5% annual Zakat rate. Our results are robust to these. 
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World Value, Growth, Small Cap, and Large Cap. In addition, we employ Carhart’s (1997) four-
factor model by adding a momentum factor to Fama and French’s three-factor model to test the 
robust ss o a  timne f our lpha es ates: 
 ܴሺௗሻ௘ ൌ ߙଷ ൅ ߚெܴெ,௧௘ ൅  ߚ௏ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚௌܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚ௎ܷܯܦ௧ ൅ ߝଷ,௧,                        (5)           ௧
where ܷܯܦ is the excess return on the mimicking portfolio for the previous 12-month winners 
minus the previous 12-month losers factor (the momentum factor). Time series data for ܪܯܮ, 
ܵܯܤ, and ܷܯܦ factors are obtained from the Kenneth French Data Library.  
To test whether IEFs are a safer investment and provide a better return than non-IEFs 
during financial crises, we run the following pooled time series regression:      
ܴ௧
ሺௗሻ௘ ൌ ߙସ ൅ ߚெܴெ,௧௘ ൅ γܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൅ ߝସ,௧,                                       (6)      
where Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of one during a period of financial crisis, 
and zero otherwise. If IEFs perform significantly better than their matched funds in crisis 
periods, we should see a positive γ  coefficient in the regression where the dependent variable is 
the difference portfolio return. We identify three major crisis periods during our sample period: 
the Asian Financial Crisis (April 1996 to September 1998); the 2000 dot.com Crisis (March 2000 
to September 2002); and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (October 2007 to February 2009) 
(Economic Cycle Research Institute, 2010; Yeyati et al., 2008).   
 
4.3  Fund performance and ethical screening intensity 
Finally, we test whether there is a relationship between ethical screening intensity and fund 
performance by running the following panel regression:  
ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵܵܿݎ݁݁݊݅݊݃ ܫ݊ݐ݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ௜   
               ൅ ܿଶܨݑ݊݀ ܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜,௧ ൅ ܿଷܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ௜,௧ ൅  ݑ௜,௧,          (7) 
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where ݕ௜,௧ is the risk-adjusted return of the Islamic fund or the difference portfolio, obtained by 
subtracting the expected return obtained from Fama and French’s three-factor model from the 
raw return (i.e. ݕ݅,ݐ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ εଶ,௧ in Equation (4)).
18 Our panel regressions control for fund 
characteristics such as Size, Age, management fees (Mgt Fees), Purification Fees, and whether the 
fund is managed by an Islamic Investment Company. We expect a positive coefficient for Size and 
Islamic Investment Company, and a negative coefficient for Age, Mgt Fees, and Purification Fees since 
larger and younger funds, and funds that are managed by an Islamic investment company and 
charge lower management and purification fees are expected to perform better (Golec, 1996; 
Renneboog et al., 2008b).  
We employ several measures of Screening Intensity.19 The first is based on screening 
information disclosed in the fund’s prospectus: the number of accounting screens, whether the 
fund employs the stricter total assets in the denominator of the accounting ratios, and the one-
third threshold ratio. Funds that enforce more and stricter accounting ratios are considered to 
have more intensive ethical screening. Accounting screens that employ total assets instead of 
market capitalization20 as the denominator or use the minimum one-third threshold value are 
considered to be stricter. 
Our second measure of screening intensity (Full Compliance) is based on fund holdings data 
which we screen using the methodology of MSCI World Islamic, widely regarded as having the 
most rigorous Sharī‘ah screens under the supervision of the prominent SAB, Dar Al Istithmar. 
First, we screen the investee firms with prohibited business activities by employing a variety of 
business activity codes. Based on the 4-digit SIC sub-industry codes, about 100 (or about 10%) 
sub-industries are prohibited Islamic investments. Second, with the exception of Islamic banks, 
firms that pass the business screens are then screened on their financial ratios. We use the 
                                                            
18 Using other benchmark models does not change our conclusion. 
19 Since we have no historical information about the screens applied by the funds, we backfill the screening 
information through time. This implicitly assumes that the screening intensity remains constant over time.  
20 Using total assets as the denominator is more rigorous since all transactions in Islamic finance must be asset-
backed. Further, market value is more volatile and often does not reflect the fundamental value of the firm. 
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following four accounting screens, just like MSCI World Islamic: (i) total debt to total assets less 
than one-third; (ii) sum of cash and short term investments to total assets less than one-third; (iii) 
accounts receivable to total assets less than one-third; and (iv) interest income to total revenues 
(or sales) less than 5%. Fund holdings that pass each accounting screen are scored one, and zero 
otherwise. For each fund, we sum up the scores across their holdings and convert it to a 
percentage value. Firms that pass both the business and accounting screens of MSCI World 
Islamic are considered to be fully-compliant. We are able to calibrate this screening intensity 
measure for a reduced sample of 126 funds for which fund holdings data are available. 
Free of this (fund holdings) data constraint, our third screening intensity measure is based 
on the returns-based style methodology of Sharpe (1992). We use the following three indexes to 
construct two (uncorrelated) ethical style factors: MSCI World Islamic (MSCI Islamic); MSCI AC 
World (MSCI AC); and Dow Jones Islamic World (DJ Islamic).21 The two ethical style factors are 
(MSCI Islamic – MSCI AC) and (MSCI Islamic – DJ Islamic); the latter is long on the more 
stringent Islamic index and short on the more liberal Islamic index.22 Including all the above 
style factors and adjusting for Fama and French's three factor gives the following five-factor 
model: 
 ܴ௧௘ ൌ ߙହ ൅ ߚଵܴ௘ ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚଷ ௧ ൣܴெௌ஼ூ ூ௦௟௔௠௜௖,௧െܴ஽௃ ூ௦௟௔௠௜௖,௧൧ ெ,௧ ൅  ߚଶ ܵܯܤ  ൅ ߚସ
                          ൅ ߚହ ൣܴெௌ஼ூ ூ௦௟௔௠௜௖,௧ െ ܴெ,௧൧ ൅ ߝହ,௧.                                       (8)    
The  ߚ4  and  ߚ5 coefficients represent the exposure of Islamic funds to the different set of 
ethical factors. We interpret higher loadings on the ethical factors as more intensive ethical 
screening by the fund.  
                                                            
21 The data series for MSCI World Islamic and DJ Islam World began in June 2002 and February 2004 respectively. 
These indexes are price return indexes in USD currency. 
22 MSCI Islamic is more stringent than DJ Islamic as it employs total assets as the denominator in the accounting 
screens and applies the dividend purification ratio; the latter is formulated as [total earnings – (income from 
prohibited activities and interest income)]/total earnings. This proportion would be deducted from all reinvested 
dividends and donated to charity (MSCI Islamic Index Series Methodology, May 2007). 
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To allow for a possible curvilinear relationship between screening intensity and fund 
performance, we add a squared term of screening intensity to our panel regression model, 
following Barnett and Salomon (2006) and Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2010). Barnett and 
Salomon (2006) find that, as the number of ethical screens increases, fund performance declines 
at first and then increases again. 
   
5. Empirical results 
5.1    Risk-adjusted performance 
Table 2 reports Jensen’s alphas obtained from the capital asset pricing model (equation 
(3)), Fama & French’s three-factor model (equation (4)), and Carhart’s four-factor model 
(equation (5)). For the full sample, IEFs underperform conventional funds by 40 basis points per 
month on average, as shown in Panel A.23 These results are robust across the various benchmark 
models and is consistent with the underperformance hypothesis (H1a). Yet, the evidence varies by 
domicile, as Panel B shows. Funds domiciled in Malaysia, Kuwait, and Indonesia perform 
significantly worse than conventional funds by 40 to 190 basis points per month. However, they 
do not perform differently from conventional funds for the rest of the 32 countries. Islamic 
equity funds on average perform worse than other SRI funds by 30 basis points per month. This 
may be driven by the high underperformance of IEFs domiciled in Indonesia (about -200 basis 
points per month).  
Looking at the results for the factor loadings, we find that overall IEFs have a significantly 
lower exposure to the market index (MKT) relative to other funds, and to the value (HML) and 
small cap (SMB) factors relative to conventional and religious funds. There is no significant 
difference in exposure to the momentum factor between Islamic equity funds and other funds.  
                                                            
23 Since IEFs have smaller investment universe than other funds, it is arguable that they may have higher total risk 
due to higher non-systematic risk. Therefore, it may be more proper to test IEF performance using Sharpe Ratio 
(excess return/total risk) rather than Jensen’s alpha where non-systematic risk is not rewarded. However, we find 
similar results using Sharpe Ratio that on average IEFs perform worse than conventional, ethical, and religious 
funds. Results are available upon request. 
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The investment style of IEFs varies across countries, as Panels B and C show. While IEFs 
in the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, and the United States have significantly greater 
exposure to the value factor than conventional funds, those in Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, 
Luxemburg, Ireland, and Cayman Islands have significantly lower exposure. IEFs in Ireland have 
greater exposure to the small-capitalization factor than conventional funds, but the reverse is 
observed for those in the United Arab Emirates, Luxemburg, and the United States. We also see 
that IEFs in Malaysia and South Africa invest relatively more in small-capitalization stocks than 
SRI funds, unlike those in Indonesia, Luxemburg, Cayman Islands, Jersey, and the United States.  
Table 3 shows the results for portfolios sorted by investment universe (regional 
orientation). On average, IEFs with Global, Domestic, and Asia Pacific investment universe 
underperform conventional peers by 30 to 60 basis points per month. Islamic funds 
underperform SRI funds in the Asia Pacific, China & Hong Kong, and domestic regions by a 
monthly average of 30 to 250 basis points. Although Islamic equity funds perform better than 
other religious funds in Muslim investment regions, we find no evidence of significant 
differences in performance across the non-Muslim investment regions.   24
For most investment regions, IEFs have significantly lower exposure to value stocks but 
greater exposure to large-capitalization stocks relative to other funds. Specifically, relative to SRI 
funds, IEFs investing in Asia Pacific and North America have greater exposure to small-
capitalization stocks but those investing globally, Asia Pacific excluding Japan, and BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China) have lower exposure. We also find IEFs that invest in North America, 
Europe, and their own domicile have greater exposure to high momentum stocks compared to 
                                                            
24 Using alternative benchmarks does not change our conclusion. For example, we use the fund’s regional 
benchmark portfolios because the fund’s investment universe benchmark may be more appropriate from an 
investor’s perspective. The home bias argument suggests that the domestic benchmark portfolio of the fund’s 
country of domicile is more appropriate. Finally, we use the US market benchmark which allows us to examine 
fund performance from an US investor’s perspective. This approach is similar to Bauer et al. (2005) for a sample of 
SRIs in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and Renneboog et al. (2008b) for a global sample of 
SRIs. 
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SRI funds. Relative to other religious funds, IEFs investing in emerging markets and North 
America have greater exposure to high momentum stocks. 
 
5.2    Fund performance in market downturns 
Next, we examine IEF performance during market downturns. Table 4 presents the results 
from regressing EW portfolio returns on the single-factor model (specifications 1 and 2) and 
Fama and French’s three-factor model (specifications 3 and 4). The coefficient on the dummy 
variable Crisis is significantly negative when IEF performance is benchmarked against SRI and 
religious funds (specifications 1 and 3) but significantly positive when benchmarked against 
conventional funds (specification 3 only). Therefore, Islamic equity funds underperform both 
SRI (80 basis points) and religious (90 basis points) funds but outperform conventional funds 
(30 basis points) in crisis periods.  
We also test each crisis separately. The results confirm the popular media claim that IEFs 
provided some protection during the GFC (by 60 basis points per month in specification 2 when 
performance is measured against conventional funds) but not other crises. Hence, whether IEFs 
can provide a safe haven to investors during crisis periods depends very much on the nature of 
the crisis. Our results confirm the findings of Abdullah et al. (2007) that Malaysian Islamic equity 
funds did not outperform conventional funds during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, and of 
Hussein and Omran (2005) that DJ Islamic did not outperform conventional benchmarks during 
the 2000 bearish market period (April 2000 to July 2003).   
 
5.3    Fund performance and ethical screening intensity 
In this section, we test the relationship between ethical screening intensity and fund 
performance. Finding empirical support for a negative relationship would indicate that there is a 
financial cost to being more “ethical”.  
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We first show the summary statistics of our ethical screening intensity measures and Fama 
& French’s risk adjusted return of Islamic equity funds which we will employ in our panel 
regression. The two ethical style factor loadings are the difference between the stringent MSCI 
Islamic and each of the following benchmarks: MSCI AC and DJ Islamic. For the full sample, 
Table 5 shows that Islamic funds have a positive loading on MSCI Islamic. However, funds 
domiciled (invest) in Muslim countries (regions) have a significantly lower exposure to (MSCI 
Islamic - MSCI AC) than those in non-Muslim countries (regions). Only funds domiciled in the 
United States and invest in BRIC have a positive loading on the less stringent DJ Islamic.  
For funds that disclose information about the accounting screenings employed (N=235), 
on average, three accounting screens, i.e. the debt ratio, the interest income ratio, and the cash & 
short term investments ratio, are used. Funds that invest in GCC&MENA (Muslim investment 
regions) employ one accounting screen more than those invest in other regions (p-value is 0.001). 
Funds domiciled in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and United Kingdom employ the three 
accounting screens in addition to the accounts receivable ratio.  Funds domiciled in Malaysia 
employ just one accounting screen (interest income ratio), reflecting the more moderate 
interpretation of Shari’ah in that country.25 Only 13% of funds employ the stringent total assets 
in the denominator and 34% use the one-third threshold in the accounting screens. Therefore, 
most funds employ a moderate accounting screening policy. While funds domiciled and invest in 
Muslim countries (regions) tend to not employ the one-third rule in their accounting screens, 
funds invest in the Muslim region tend to employ total assets in the denominator.    
For the reduced sample which we could compute our holdings-based measure of ethical 
screening intensity, we find only 42% of the fund holdings pass the total debt/total assets<33% 
                                                            
25 Effective from November 2013, the Sharī‘ah Advisory Council of Securities Commission Malaysia will 
substantially intensify the Sharī‘ah screening of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. A two-tier approach focusing 
on business activity and the newly-introduced financial ratio benchmark, including the one-third rule for financial 
leverage, will be applied (http://210.48.155.251/main.asp?pageid=1170&menuid=1049&newsid 
=&linkid=&type=). 
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screen (Debt Ratio Compliance).26 The percentage of fund holdings that pass all the business 
activity and accounting ratio screens of MSCI Islamic (Full Compliance) is even lower, at 25%. As 
expected, funds domiciled in Muslim countries or invest in Muslim regions have a significantly 
higher proportion of fund holdings passing all screens. The average Fama & French’s risk 
adjusted return of Islamic equity funds is relatively small at about -0.05% per month, and is 
smaller by 0.46% per month for funds with a GCC&MENA regional orientation.  
Table 6 presents the univariate tests of differences in fund characteristics between funds 
with “high” and “low” Fama & French’s risk adjusted return, using the mean value of -0.05% as 
the cutoff. It can be seen that larger funds with lower Full Compliance and Debt Ratio Compliance 
have a significantly higher Fama & French’s risk adjusted return.   
Controlling for other variables, Table 7 presents the panel regression results where the 
intensity of ethical screening is proxied by the style factor loadings on ethical benchmarks and 
the number and type of accounting screens employed. Results for the relationship between the 
factor loadings and IEF performance depend on how we benchmark performance. The 
relationship is significantly negative for the (MSCI Islamic – MSCI AC) factor when IEF 
performance is measured relative to other religious funds – for every one unit increase in the 
ethical loading factor, the performance reduces by 13 basis points per month (specification 7). In 
contrast, we find a positive relationship between the (MSCI Islamic – DJ Islamic) factor and the 
performance of IEF relative to other conventional funds – for every one unit increase in the 
ethical loading factor, the performance raises by 5.5 basis points per month (specification 3).  
The relationship between our second measure of ethical screening intensity, the number of 
accounting screens employed, and IEF performance is also mixed and depends on how we 
benchmark performance. When we benchmark IEF performance against conventional and SRI 
funds, the number of accounting screens is insignificant in explaining performance similar with 
the results in Table 7 using the (MSCI Islamic – MSCI AC) ethical loading factor. Renneboog et 
                                                            
26 We do not use business and the other accounting ratio screen compliance measures since most funds (of about 
90%) comply with them (Nainggolan et al., 2012). 
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al. (2008b) also find the number of ethical screens employed by SRI funds is unrelated to 
performance. However, we find a positive (curvilinear) relationship when Islamic fund 
performance is measured relative to religious funds. That is, Islamic fund performance first 
increases as the number of screens increases, reaching a maximum at three accounting screens, 
and decreases thereafter. This result is in contrast to Barnett and Salomon (2006) who report a 
negative non-linear relationship between SRI fund performance and the number of ethical 
screens employed.  
Our third measure of screening intensity is the strictness of the accounting screens 
employed, i.e. whether the fund employs total assets as the denominator in the accounting ratios 
or the one-third threshold value. Results show that neither is significantly related to fund 
performance, irrespective of the performance benchmark we use supporting H3b. 
Echoing the findings in Table 4, we see that IEFs outperform conventional funds during 
the GFC by approximately 40 basis points per month (specifications 3 and 4), controlling for 
other variables. As expected, there is a positive relationship between fund Size and fund 
performance, suggesting that larger funds perform better. Consistent with Capelle-Blancard and 
Monjon (2010), Golec (1996), and Renneboog et al. (2008b), younger funds (Age) perform better 
than older funds when performance is benchmarked against SRI and religious funds. While 
management fee does not appear to drive cross-sectional differences in fund performance, we 
note that funds that charge higher Purification Fees significantly underperform religious funds. 
Hence, non-compliance cost that applies only to IEFs and not other religious funds affect fund 
performance more than management fees. Finally, having an Islamic equity fund managed by a 
pure Islamic Investment Company improves fund performance.  
Table 8 presents the panel regression results for the reduced sample for which we could 
compute our holdings-based measure of ethical screening intensity, i.e., Full Compliance and Debt 
Ratio Compliance. For this reduced sample, we find a negative relationship between Full Compliance 
and fund performance, supporting the underperformance hypothesis H1b. Similar results are obtained 
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when we use the percentage of fund holdings that pass the total debt to assets ratio screen (Debt 
Ratio Compliance). The remaining results are as before.  
 
5.4 Additional robustness tests 
In this section, we check the robustness of our results by comparing the performance of 
Islamic indexes with matched (on region) conventional, SRI, and religious indexes. There are 
several benefits to using Islamic indexes rather than the funds themselves in performance 
measurement. First, because an index is the market itself, it shows the performance of the most 
efficient portfolio given the screens employed. Second, indexes are passive portfolios, free of 
management fees, manager skills, and other fund characteristics which may obscure the 
relationship between ethical screening and performance. Third, we can be certain that Islamic 
indexes comply with their ethical screens because they have to protect their credibility in order to 
attract the market to use their ethical screens as the investment benchmarks. In short, using 
indexes allows us to test more accurately whether ethical screening intensity alone affects 
performance.  
We select the indexes based on the investment orientation of our sample of Islamic funds. 
Therefore, we employ nine regional and nine country (domestic) Islamic indexes.27 Due to data 
limitation,28 we select Islamic indexes issued by MSCI Islamic, Dow Jones Islamic, FTSE 
Shariah, and FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS Shariah. All are price return indexes in USD. Next, we 
match the selected Islamic indexes with conventional, SRI, and religious indexes. Since there are 
only very few religious indexes in the world, we use FTSE Catholic as the only religious index.  
As before, we measure portfolio performance by subtracting monthly realized returns from 
the expected return from the Fama and French’s three-factor model. Table 9 presents the panel 
                                                            
27 The regions are Asia Pacific; Asia Pacific ex Japan; Brazil, Russia, India, and China; China and Hong Kong; 
Europe; GCC&MENA; Global; Emerging Markets; and North America. The domiciles are Malaysia, the United 
States, Canada, Indonesia, Thailand, South Africa, India, the United Kingdom, and Japan. 
28 The number of ethical index providers is small and few indexes have extensive performance histories. 
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regression results. Islamic indexes underperformed the conventional, SRI, and religious 
benchmarks during the 2000.dotcom crisis but outperformed them during GFC. The latter 
substantiates our earlier result when IEF performance is benchmarked relative to conventional 
funds. However, unlike the fund-level results, the outperformance of Islamic indexes is 
economically much smaller, about 23 basis points per month or 2.8% per year. 
In contrast to the fund-level results, there is evidence of a curvilinear relationship between 
the aggregate Islamic fund performance and the number of accounting screens, consistent with 
Barnett and Salomon (2006). In specifications 1, 5, and 7, the relationship is negative at first but 
becomes less negative (or even positive) when the number of accounting screens employed 
exceeds three. The opposite is however found when performance is measured relative to 
conventional indexes. We also find employing the stricter accounting screen of the one-third 
threshold reduces portfolio performance by 50 basis points per month. This result remains intact 
when performance is measured relative to matched SRI and other religious indexes but not 
relative to conventional indexes. Finally, consistent with our earlier findings for IEFs, employing 
purification fees reduces portfolio performance. 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
Ever since ethical funds were first launched more than a century ago, academics and 
practitioners have been mauling over the question of whether investors sacrifice financial returns 
in pursuit of ethical objectives. This line of enquiry is important to an ever increasing number of 
investors who are keen to align their ethical beliefs with their investment decision making 
process so as to benefit the society.  
In this paper, we examine the over-performance, underperformance, and the no-difference in 
performance hypotheses for a homogenous group of ethical funds – Islamic equity funds. Our 
tests of 387 IEFs domiciled in 32 countries with investments in 11 regions from 1984 to 2010 
show that, consistent with the underperformance hypothesis, IEFs underperform conventional 
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and SRI funds by 30 to 40 basis points per month, on average. These results suggest that 
investors pay a financial cost for being ethical. We find little evidence that Islamic funds perform 
differently from other religious funds, corroborating the view that Islamic investment is another 
class of faith-based ethical investments with similar returns. However, fund performance varies 
by domicile and regional orientation, suggesting that location may be an important determinant 
of differences in fund performance. Our results are robust to the various returns generating 
models used. 
Employing Fama & French’s three-factor model, we find that on average IEFs have a 
lower exposure to the market, value, and size factors than conventional and religious funds. 
Using Carhart’s model, we find no difference in exposure to the momentum factor relative to 
other funds. Consistent with media claims that Islamic funds are a safer investment, we find that 
they outperformed (by 60 basis points) conventional funds during the recent sub-prime crisis. 
However, we do not find this for other crisis periods.  
The final enquiry we pursue in this paper is whether the intensity of ethical screening is 
related to fund performance. Employing the fund’s ethical factor loadings and the number of 
accounting screens employed as proxies for ethical screening intensity, our findings depend on 
how we benchmark performance. The relationship is insignificant when we benchmark IEF 
performance against SRI funds. When we measure IEF performance relative to other religious 
funds, we find it is negatively related to  the (MSCI Islamic – MSCI AC) factor, and its 
relationship with the number of accounting screens employed is curvilinear. However, 
relationship is positive when IEF performance is benchmarked relative to conventional funds. 
Our holdings-based measure of ethical screening intensity is negatively related to performance, 
but this finding is applicable only to the reduced sample with holdings data.  
We check the robustness of our results by replicating the tests using Islamic indexes 
instead. As with the fund-level results, there is a negative (curvilinear) relationship between the 
aggregate Islamic fund performance and the number of accounting screens employed. Further, 
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employing the stricter accounting screen (one-third threshold) and purification fees reduces 
portfolio performance. Finally, while the relationship between ethical screening intensity and 
fund performance relative to other conventional funds is mixed, the relationship between ethical 
screening intensity and the performance of Islamic funds relative to other SRI and religious 
funds is negative.    
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of Islamic equity funds  
by country of domicile and regional orientation 
Size is the fund’s total assets under management (in USD million); Age is measured from the inception date to the test date (in 
months); Mgt Fees is management fees (%); Purification Fees (%) is the fund’s non-compliant income over net assets as reported in 
the annual report; and Islamic Investment Company equals one if the fund is managed by an Islamic investment company and zero 
otherwise. Included in “Others” are the four Muslim domiciles (Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Qatar) and 15 non-Muslim 
domiciles (Australia, British Virgins Islands, Canada, Channel Islands, Guernsey, India, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, and unidentified cases). GCC denotes Gulf Coast Countries; MENA denotes Middle 
East North Africa; and BRIC denotes Brazil, Russia, India and China. P-values are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
No. 
Funds
Purification 
Fees  (%)
Panel A. Full Sample (N=387)
Mean 70.15 66.93 1.61 0.04 0.18
Median 17.00 46.80 1.50 0.00 0.00
Malaysia 83 62.24 91.59 1.53 0.02 0.08
Saudi Arabia 36 71.76 67.98 1.83 0.00 0.58
United Arab Emirates 33 206.28 88.54 1.71 0.00 0.39
Kuwait 25 61.95 60.46 1.68 0.00 0.20
Indonesia 16 15.07 48.88 1.89 0.00 0.06
Bahrain 9 17.08 47.69 1.64 0.00 0.33
Others (4 domiciles) 18 20.51 56.78 1.91 0.04 0.17
Mean 76.68 75.98 1.68 0.01 0.24
Median 17.00 57.05 1.50 0.00 0.00
Luxemburg 54 19.59 41.42 1.52 0.03 0.09
Ireland 17 22.30 46.48 1.65 0.67 0.06
South Africa 15 70.46 57.23 1.44 0.06 0.00
Cayman Islands 12 19.88 64.64 1.26 0.00 0.08
Jersey 12 64.58 32.41 1.47 0.00 0.08
United States 7 409.09 129.48 0.87 0.00 0.86
United Kingdom 5 18.15 38.60 1.30 0.00 0.00
Others (15 domiciles) 45 24.57 67.46 1.63 0.01 0.04
Mean 45.31 55.00 1.50 0.09 0.10
Median 18.81 37.33 1.50 0.00 0.00
Panel D. Muslim Vs. Non-Muslim Domiciles
Mean difference 31.36 20.98 *** 0.19 *** -0.08 0.15 ***
(0.123) (0.001) (0.006) (0.143) (0.000)
GCC and MENA
Mean 101.78 54.00 1.66 0.01 0.22
Median 29.48 45.00 1.50 0.00 0.00
Global 98 27.41 62.43 1.51 0.13 0.16
Domestic 83 108.00 92.53 1.51 0.01 0.18
Asia Pacific 61 32.19 71.49 1.71 0.02 0.16
Asia Pacific ex Japan 15 27.91 27.99 1.62 0.04 0.00
Emerging Markets 13 39.81 36.03 1.99 0.00 0.31
North America 11 20.41 96.27 1.68 0.00 0.09
Europe 8 14.52 101.15 1.84 0.00 0.38
China and Hong Kong 5 78.22 32.69 1.55 0.04 0.20
BRIC 3 6.60 15.53 1.63 0.03 0.00
Mean 52.27 70.57 1.59 0.05 0.17
Median 16.50 47.17 1.50 0.00 0.00
Panel G. Muslim Vs. Non-Muslim Investment Regions
Mean difference 49.52 ** -16.57 ** 0.07 -0.04 0.06
(0.042) (0.030) (0.385) (0.569) (0.219)
Panel F. Non-Muslim Investment Regions (N=302)
Size ($mil) Age (Months) Mgt Fees  (%)
Islamic 
Investment 
Company
Panel E. Muslim Investment Regions (N=85)
Panel C. Non-Muslim Domiciles (N=167)
Panel B. Muslim Domiciles (N=220)
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Table 2 
Jensen’s alphas of equity funds sorted by country of domicile, 1984 – 2010 
Jensen’s alpha is estimated by regressing monthly excess returns of equally-weighted portfolios on excess market returns by 
country of domicile (CAPM). The risk-free rate is the 90-day US Treasury Bill rate and the market benchmark is the MSCI AC 
World index. MKT is the excess market return factor. Fama & French’s model (F&F) adds the HML (MSCI Value–MSCI Growth) 
and SMB (MSCI Small Cap–MSCI Large Cap) factors to the Jensen’s alpha model. Carhart’s model adds the value, size, and 
momentum (MOM) factors to the Jensen’s alpha model. IEF is Islamic equity fund, CEF is conventional equity fund, SRI is 
socially responsible investment fund, and REF is religious equity fund. (IEF-CEF), (IEF-SRI), and (IEF-REF) are the return 
difference portfolios. Included in “Others” are the four Muslim domiciles (Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Qatar) and 15 non-
Muslim domiciles (Australia, British Virgins Islands, Canada, Channel Islands, Guernsey, India, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, 
Mauritius, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, and unidentified cases). T-ratios (not reported) are computed using the 
robust Newey-West HAC standard errors. The symbols ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
CAPM F&F Carhart MKT HML SMB MOM
Panel A. Full Sample (N=387)
IEF 0.001 0.000 -0.004 ** 0.639 *** -0.272 *** 0.333 *** 0.035
IEF-CEF -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.089 *** -0.128 *** -0.106 *** -0.021
IEF-SRI -0.003 * -0.003 ** -0.004 ** -0.239 *** -0.080 0.089 0.047
IEF-REF -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.222 *** -0.233 *** -0.262 *** 0.028
Panel B. Muslim Domiciles (N=220)
Malaysia IEF -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 * 0.441 *** -0.229 * 0.599 *** 0.032
IEF-CEF -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 ** -0.058 * -0.194 *** 0.043 -0.032
IEF-SRI -0.005 * -0.008 ** -0.004 -0.386 *** 0.024 0.364 ** 0.029
IEF-REF -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.437 *** -0.185 -0.072 -0.030
Saudi Arabia IEF 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.776 *** -0.332 *** 0.348 *** -0.005
IEF-CEF -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.031 -0.236 *** -0.015 -0.028
IEF-SRI -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.108 ** -0.082 0.084 -0.005
IEF-REF 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.106 * -0.347 *** -0.228 * 0.047
United Arab Emirates IEF -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 0.411 *** -0.229 * 0.399 *** 0.037
IEF-CEF -0.006 -0.002 -0.009 * -0.202 ** 0.544 *** -0.372 * -0.024
IEF-SRI -0.006 ** -0.003 -0.004 -0.386 *** -0.160 -0.200 0.026
IEF-REF -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.428 *** -0.367 ** -0.225 0.068
Kuwait IEF 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.407 *** 0.517 ** 0.291 0.004
IEF-CEF -0.012 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** 0.017 0.016 -0.127 0.003
IEF-SRI 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.410 *** 0.634 *** -0.138 -0.051
IEF-REF 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.541 *** 0.732 *** -0.117 -0.078
Indonesia IEF 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.840 *** -0.540 * 0.409 -0.264 **
IEF-CEF -0.017 *** -0.017 *** -0.019 *** -0.453 *** 0.217 -0.149 -0.128
IEF-SRI -0.020 *** -0.019 *** -0.021 *** -0.159 -0.535 * -0.604 ** 0.118
IEF-REF 0.005 0.005 0.007 -0.039 -0.288 0.019 -0.283 ***
Bahrain IEF 0.006 * 0.004 0.005 0.432 *** -0.256 0.321 * 0.064
IEF-CEF -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.370 *** 0.070 -0.223 -0.051
IEF-SRI 0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.515 *** 0.012 -0.459 0.106
IEF-REF 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.419 *** -0.223 -0.193 -0.003
Others (4 domiciles) IEF 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.611 *** -0.023 0.023 0.089
IEF-CEF 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.055 0.264 -0.212 0.059
IEF-SRI 0.004 0.005 0.008 -0.229 ** 0.129 -0.424 0.092
IEF-REF 0.001 0.003 0.006 -0.228 * -0.027 -0.600 * 0.108
Jensen's alpha Factor Loadings
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 Table 2 
Jensen’s alphas of equity funds sorted by country of domicile, 1984 – 2010 (Continued) 
 
 
  
CAPM F&F Carhart MKT HML SMB MOM
Panel C. Non-Muslim Domiciles (N=167)
Luxemburg IEF 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.894 *** -0.541 *** 0.102 ** 0.053 **
IEF-CEF -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.025 -0.435 *** -0.305 *** 0.050 *
IEF-SRI -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.059 -0.466 *** -0.174 * 0.016
IEF-REF 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.115 ** -0.457 *** -0.321 *** 0.082 **
Ireland IEF 0.003 * 0.003 0.002 0.853 *** 0.056 0.121 0.062 *
IEF-CEF -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.187 *** -0.221 *** 0.305 *** 0.110 ***
IEF-SRI 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.121 *** 0.089 -0.124 0.162 ***
IEF-REF 0.005 * 0.003 0.003 -0.203 *** 0.487 *** 0.111 -0.004
South Africa IEF 0.009 *** 0.007 ** 0.008 *** 0.547 *** 0.188 0.558 *** 0.010
IEF-CEF 0.005 0.003 0.005 -0.199 *** 0.274 ** 0.066 -0.065
IEF-SRI 0.006 ** 0.004 0.007 ** -0.238 *** 0.373 *** 0.441 *** 0.002
IEF-REF 0.006 * 0.007 * 0.009 *** -0.297 *** 0.211 -0.260 0.026
Cayman Islands IEF 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.852 *** -0.424 *** -0.006 0.021
IEF-CEF -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.389 *** -0.009 -0.021
IEF-SRI -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.058 -0.132 -0.330 *** -0.045
IEF-REF 0.000 0.002 0.003 -0.049 -0.274 *** -0.791 *** -0.022
Jersey IEF 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.384 *** 0.005 -0.075 -0.014
IEF-CEF 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.143 *** 0.056 -0.262 * -0.055
IEF-SRI 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.475 *** 0.073 -0.916 *** 0.066
IEF-REF -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.250 *** -0.086 -0.538 *** 0.074
United Kingdom IEF 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.728 *** -0.464 ** 0.188 0.089
IEF-CEF -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 -0.126 -0.086 -0.078
IEF-SRI -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.038 -0.541 *** -0.177 -0.010
IEF-REF -0.002 -0.009 * -0.005 0.198 -1.294 *** -0.070 0.184
United States IEF 0.001 0.001 -0.003 *** 0.872 *** -0.382 *** 0.173 *** 0.042 **
IEF-CEF -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.302 *** 0.374 *** -0.695 *** -0.035
IEF-SRI -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.192 *** -0.175 * -0.249 ** 0.127 ***
IEF-REF 0.002 0.004 * 0.003 * -0.045 -0.177 ** -0.539 *** 0.039
Others (15 domiciles) IEF 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.840 *** -0.593 ** 0.288 0.002
IEF-CEF 0.003 0.003 0.006 -0.081 -0.205 0.025 0.033
IEF-SRI 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.191 -0.634 -0.076 -0.082
IEF-REF 0.002 0.001 0.005 -0.116 ** -0.437 0.076 -0.005
Jensen's alpha Factor Loadings
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Table 3 
Jensen’s alphas of equity funds sorted by regional orientation, 1984 – 2010 
Jensen’s alpha is estimated by regressing monthly excess returns of equally-weighted portfolios on excess market returns by 
regional orientation (CAPM). The risk-free rate is the 90-day US Treasury Bill rate and the market benchmark is the MSCI AC 
World index. MKT is the excess market return factor. Fama & French’s model (F&F) adds the HML (MSCI Value–MSCI Growth) 
and SMB (MSCI Small Cap–MSCI Large Cap) factors to the Jensen’s alpha model. Carhart’s model adds the value, size, and 
momentum (MOM) factors to the Jensen’s alpha model. IEF is Islamic equity fund, CEF is conventional equity fund, SRI is 
socially responsible investment fund, and REF is religious equity fund. (IEF-CEF), (IEF-SRI), and (IEF-REF) are the return 
difference portfolios. GCC denotes Gulf Coast Countries, MENA denotes Middle East North Africa; and BRIC denotes Brazil, 
Russia, India and China. T-ratios (not reported) are computed using the robust Newey-West HAC standard errors. The symbols 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
   
CAPM F&F Carhart MKT HML SMB MOM
Panel A. Muslim Investment Regions (N=85)
GCC and MENA IEF 0.008 *** 0.006 ** 0.006 ** 0.460 *** 0.058 0.414 *** -0.006
IEF-CEF 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.160 *** 0.035 -0.060 -0.006
IEF-SRI 0.006 ** 0.005 0.008 ** -0.345 *** 0.248 * -0.155 -0.025
IEF-REF 0.006 * 0.005 0.008 ** -0.400 *** -0.001 -0.240 0.023
Panel B. Non-Muslim Investment Regions (N=302)
Global IEF 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.788 *** -0.409 *** 0.156 *** 0.017
IEF-CEF -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 ** -0.022 -0.264 *** -0.119 ** -0.011
IEF-SRI -0.001 -0.002 * 0.000 -0.074 ** -0.221 *** -0.103 * 0.022
IEF-REF -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.056 -0.332 *** -0.426 *** 0.030
Domestic IEF 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.577 *** -0.208 *** 0.403 *** 0.039
IEF-CEF -0.004 *** -0.002 -0.005 *** -0.114 *** 0.194 *** -0.275 *** -0.047
IEF-SRI -0.003 * -0.001 -0.004 ** -0.231 *** -0.109 0.045 0.058 *
IEF-REF 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.296 *** -0.220 ** -0.224 ** 0.053
Asia Pacific IEF -0.002 -0.005 * -0.005 * 0.508 *** -0.280 ** 0.601 *** 0.032
IEF-CEF -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.090 *** -0.157 ** -0.015 -0.038
IEF-SRI -0.006 ** -0.010 *** -0.006 ** -0.407 *** -0.077 0.299 ** 0.050
IEF-REF -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.375 *** -0.182 -0.102 -0.028
Asia Pacific ex Japan IEF 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.777 *** -0.577 ** -0.173 -0.020
IEF-CEF -0.005 * -0.005 -0.006 * -0.363 *** -0.037 -0.115 -0.017
IEF-SRI -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.099 -0.102 -0.747 *** 0.075
IEF-REF 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.091 -0.500 * -0.061 0.013
Emerging Markets IEF 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.970 *** -0.310 *** 0.280 ** 0.066
IEF-CEF -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.243 *** -0.092 -0.691 *** 0.028
IEF-SRI -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.107 * -0.178 0.126 0.076
IEF-REF 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.180 ** -0.163 0.451 ** 0.190 ***
North America IEF 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.782 *** -0.188 *** 0.083 * 0.023
IEF-CEF -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.130 *** -0.046 -0.265 *** 0.007
IEF-SRI 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.046 0.085 0.531 *** 0.114 **
IEF-REF 0.003 0.003 0.003 * -0.115 *** -0.190 ** -0.267 *** 0.101 ***
Europe IEF 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.859 *** -0.344 *** 0.192 ** 0.067 *
IEF-CEF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.021 -0.475 *** 0.103 0.093 **
IEF-SRI -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.031 -0.282 ** 0.192 0.081 *
IEF-REF 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.019 -0.263 ** -0.416 *** 0.053
China & Hong Kong IEF 0.006 0.003 0.005 1.025 *** -1.094 *** -0.264 -0.013
IEF-CEF -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.093 0.177 0.429 -0.087
IEF-SRI -0.022 ** -0.024 ** -0.025 *** -0.471 *** 0.002 0.402 0.151
IEF-REF 0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.059 -0.455 0.018 -0.085
BRIC IEF 0.025 * 0.009 0.003 1.696 *** -1.574 * 0.289 -0.331 **
IEF-CEF 0.023 0.005 0.002 1.702 *** -1.598 0.541 -0.354 **
IEF-SRI 0.031 * 0.045 ** 0.025 0.810 ** -0.220 -1.529 * -0.177
IEF-REF na na na na na na na
Jensen's alpha Factor Loadings
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Table 4 
Performance of Islamic equity funds during crisis periods 
Regressions are performed on equally-weighted portfolios. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a crisis period 
(the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2000.dotcom crisis, or the 2008 Global Financial Crisis) and zero otherwise. Asian Financial 
Crisis, The 2000.dotcom Crisis, and Global Financial Crisis take the value of 1 for each of the economic crises and zero otherwise. The 
risk-free rate is the 90-day US Treasury Bill rate and the market benchmark is the MSCI AC World index. MKT is the excess 
market return factor; HML is the (MSCI Value–MSCI Growth) factor; and SMB is the (MSCI Small Cap–MSCI Large Cap) factor. 
IEF is Islamic equity fund, CEF is conventional equity fund, SRI is socially responsible investment fund, and REF is religious 
equity fund. (IEF-CEF), (IEF-SRI), and (IEF-REF) are the return difference portfolios. T-ratios (not reported) are computed 
using the robust Newey-West HAC standard errors. The symbol ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Number of funds = 387. 
 
IEF IEF-CEF IEF-SRI IEF-REF
Specification (1)
Alpha 0.004 * -0.004 *** -0.001 0.002
MKT 0.504 *** -0.081 ** -0.107 * -0.211 ***
Crisis -0.008 ** 0.002 -0.008 * -0.009 *
Adj R-Sqr 0.566 0.055 0.124 0.114
Specification (2)
Alpha 0.004 * -0.004 *** -0.001 0.003
MKT 0.575 *** -0.085 *** -0.183 *** -0.242 ***
Asian Financial Crisis -0.012 ** 0.003 -0.015 *** -0.006
The 2000.dotcom Crisis -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.014 **
Global Financial Crisis -0.006 0.006 ** 0.000 -0.005
Adj R-Sqr 0.559 0.059 0.113 0.116
Specification (3)
Alpha 0.002 -0.005 *** -0.001 0.005 *
MKT 0.615 *** -0.029 -0.199 *** -0.261 ***
HML -0.268 *** -0.140 *** -0.089 -0.239 ***
SMB 0.317 *** -0.093 ** 0.070 -0.299 ***
Crisis -0.006 * 0.003 * -0.009 * -0.012 **
Adj R-Sqr 0.836 0.263 0.297 0.220
Specification (4)
Alpha 0.002 -0.004 *** 0.001 0.005 **
MKT 0.624 *** -0.075 *** -0.255 *** -0.263 ***
HML -0.276 *** -0.125 *** -0.097 * -0.237 ***
SMB 0.297 *** -0.095 * 0.020 -0.300 ***
Asian Financial Crisis -0.011 * 0.003 -0.019 *** -0.012
The 2000.dotcom Crisis -0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.012 **
Global Financial Crisis -0.004 0.005 ** -0.006 -0.011
Adj R-Sqr 0.838 0.247 0.319 0.215
Difference Portfolios
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Table 5 
Ethical screening intensity and Fama&French's risk adjusted return of Islamic equity 
funds by country of domicile and regional orientation 
Ethical screening intensity is proxied by ethical factor loadings which are estimated by running the Fama-French's three-factor 
model that adds (MSCI Islamic - MSCI AC) and (MSCI Islamic - DJ Islamic) benchmarks; No Accounting Screens, the number of 
accounting screens employed by IEFs; D_Employ Total Assets, which equals one if the fund discloses using total assets in the 
denominator of accounting screens and zero otherwise; D_Employ One-Third Threshold, which equals one if the fund discloses 
using one-third as the minimum threshold in the accounting screens and zero otherwise; Full Compliance is the fraction of fund 
holdings passing both the business and accounting screens of MSCI Islamic; and Debt Ratio Compliance is the fraction of fund 
holdings passing the total debt/total assets<1/3 screen. Fama & French’s model (F&F) adds the HML (MSCI Value–MSCI 
Growth) and SMB (MSCI Small Cap–MSCI Large Cap) factors to the Jensen’s alpha model. The risk-free rate is the 90-day US 
Treasury Bill rate and the market benchmark is the MSCI AC World index. Included in “Others” are the four Muslim domiciles 
(Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Qatar) and 15 non-Muslim domiciles (Australia, British Virgins Islands, Canada, Channel Islands, 
Guernsey, India, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, and unidentified cases). 
GCC denotes Gulf Coast Countries; MENA denotes Middle East North Africa; and BRIC denotes Brazil, Russia, India and 
China. P-values are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
  
No. 
Funds
(MSCI 
Islamic - 
DJ 
Islamic)
Panel A. Full Sample
Mean 0.72 1.29 2.65 0.13 0.34 0.42 0.25 -0.00051
Median 0.60 0.98 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.25 -0.00005
Number of obs 372 372 235 233 232 125 125 380
Malaysia 81 0.32 1.30 1.51 0.07 0.01 0.39 0.27 0.00055
Saudi Arabia 36 0.85 1.18 3.93 0.04 0.04 0.48 0.31 -0.00134
United Arab Emirates 33 0.86 0.51 3.79 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.13 -0.00270
Kuwait 25 0.13 0.30 3.00 0.36 0.45 na na -0.00676
Indonesia 15 1.10 4.29 2.25 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.28 0.00455
Bahrain 9 0.00 2.10 3.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.25 -0.01001
Others (4 domiciles) 18 0.02 2.49 3.88 1.00 0.00 na na 0.00729
Mean 0.48 1.37 2.55 0.16 0.07 0.44 0.27 -0.00070
Median 0.45 1.15 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.28 0.00006
Luxemburg 50 1.22 0.80 2.60 0.15 0.80 0.38 0.22 -0.00038
Ireland 17 1.28 1.43 3.00 0.07 0.93 0.16 0.14 -0.00195
South Africa 15 0.56 2.89 2.00 0.00 0.70 0.34 0.26 0.00399
Cayman Islands 12 1.47 1.09 2.50 0.25 0.75 na na -0.00137
Jersey 12 0.17 0.37 na na na na na -0.00438
United States 7 0.24 -1.73 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.12 0.00201
United Kingdom 5 1.07 0.17 4.60 0.00 0.80 na na 0.00398
Others (15 domiciles) 45 1.06 1.98 2.90 0.10 0.50 0.58 0.24 -0.00248
Mean 1.06 1.19 2.79 0.09 0.71 0.37 0.21 -0.00026
Median 0.86 0.70 3.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.20 -0.00021
Mean difference -0.57 *** 0.18 -0.24 0.06 -0.65 *** 0.07 0.06 * -0.00044
(0.000) (0.488) (0.142) (0.153) (0.000) (0.105) (0.053) (0.640)
GCC and MENA
Mean 0.48 1.17 3.29 0.24 0.21 0.69 0.37 -0.00411
Median 0.53 0.87 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.36 -0.00385
Global 93 0.86 0.66 3.11 0.05 0.61 0.25 0.18 -0.00057
Domestic 83 0.68 1.69 1.74 0.06 0.12 0.40 0.24 0.00088
Asia Pacific 60 0.56 1.89 2.55 0.26 0.15 0.46 0.30 0.00084
Asia Pacific ex Japan 14 1.09 2.15 2.43 0.29 0.64 0.50 0.29 0.00289
Emerging Markets 13 1.29 2.68 2.60 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.00386
North America 11 0.91 -0.66 3.11 0.00 0.56 0.11 0.00 -0.00204
Europe 8 0.51 3.17 3.25 0.00 0.50 0.36 0.32 0.00191
China and Hong Kong 5 2.34 1.46 2.25 0.25 0.50 0.78 0.43 -0.00037
BRIC 3 3.01 -2.10 3.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.18 0.00714
Mean 0.80 1.33 2.54 0.11 0.36 0.39 0.24 0.00052
Median 0.64 1.01 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.25 0.00043
Mean difference -0.32 ** -0.17 0.75 *** 0.12 ** -0.16 * 0.30 *** 0.13 *** -0.00463 ***
(0.038) (0.595) (0.001) (0.045) (0.074) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Full 
Compliance
Debt Ratio 
Compliance
Fama & 
French's Risk 
Adjusted 
Return
Number of 
Accounting 
Screens
D_Employ 
Total 
Assets 
Panel D. Muslim Vs. Non-Muslim Domiciles
Panel E. Muslim Investment Regions (N=85)
Panel F. Non-Muslim Investment Regions (N=302)
Panel G. Muslim Vs. Non-Muslim Investment Regions
D_Employ 
One-Third 
Threshold
(MSCI 
Islamic - 
MSCI AC)
Panel B. Muslim Domiciles (N=220)
Panel C. Non-Muslim Domiciles (N=167)
37 
 
Table 6 
Univariate tests of differences in fund characteristics between  
Islamic equity funds with high and low Fama&French's risk adjusted return 
“High” and “Low” are based on the mean value (-0.05%) of Fama&French’s (F&F) risk adjusted return. F&F three-factor model 
adds the HML (MSCI Value–MSCI Growth) and SMB (MSCI Small Cap–MSCI Large Cap) factors to the Jensen’s alpha model. The 
risk-free rate is the 90-day US Treasury Bill rate and the market benchmark is the MSCI AC World index. Ethical screening 
intensity is proxied by ethical factor loadings which are estimated by running the Fama-French's three-factor model that adds 
(MSCI Islamic - MSCI AC) and (MSCI Islamic - DJ Islamic) benchmarks; No Accounting Screens, the number of accounting screens 
employed by IEFs; D_Employ Total Assets, which equals one if the fund discloses using total assets in the denominator of 
accounting screens and zero otherwise; D_Employ One-Third Threshold, which equals one if the fund discloses using one-third as 
the minimum threshold in the accounting screens and zero otherwise; Full Compliance which is the fraction of fund holdings 
passing both the business and accounting screens of MSCI Islamic; and Debt Ratio Compliance which is the fraction of fund 
holdings passing the total debt/total assets<1/3 screen. Size is the fund’s total assets under management (in USD million); Age is 
measured from the inception date to the test date (in months); Purification Fees (%) is the fund’s non-compliant income over net 
assets as reported in the fund’s annual report; and Islamic Investment Company equals one if the fund is managed by an Islamic 
investment company and zero otherwise. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
 
  
High Low
(MSCI Islamic - MSCI AC) 0.742 0.704 0.038 (0.769) 372
(MSCI Islamic -  DJ Islamic) 1.349 1.232 0.117 (0.656) 372
No Accounting Screens 2.649 2.643 0.006 (0.971) 229
D_Employ Total Assets 0.124 0.143 -0.019 (0.680) 227
D_Employ One-Third Threshold 0.313 0.357 -0.045 (0.482) 226
Full Compliance 0.238 0.291 -0.053 * (0.070) 123
Debt Ratio Compliance 0.384 0.497 -0.113 *** (0.007) 123
Size  ($mil) 87.591 37.174 50.417 ** (0.014) 380
Age  (Months) 65.999 70.008 -4.009 (0.533) 380
Mgt Fees  (%) 1.589 1.622 -0.033 (0.632) 371
Purification Fees  (%) 0.024 0.067 -0.043 (0.427) 380
Islamic Investment Company 0.163 0.203 -0.041 (0.304) 380
Fama&French's 
Risk Adjusted 
Return High-Low p-value N
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Table 7 
Panel regressions of IEF performance and ethical screening intensity 
Portfolio performance is measured by subtracting monthly realized return from the expected return as per Fama and French’s 
three-factor model. Ethical screening intensity is proxied by ethical factor loadings (MSCI Islamic - MSCI AC) and (MSCI Islamic - 
DJ Islamic); No Accounting Screens, the number of accounting screens employed by IEFs; D_Employ Total Assets, which equals one if 
the fund discloses using total assets in the denominator of accounting screens and zero otherwise; and D_Employ One-Third 
Threshold, which equals one if the fund discloses using one-third as the minimum threshold in the accounting screens and zero 
otherwise. Asian Financial Crisis, The 2000.dotcom Crisis, and Global Financial Crisis take the value of 1 for each of the economic 
crises and zero otherwise. Size is the fund’s total assets under management (in USD million); Age is measured from the inception 
date to the test date (in months); Purification Fees (%) is the fund’s non-compliant income over net assets as reported in the fund’s 
annual report; and Islamic Investment Company equals one if the fund is managed by an Islamic investment company and zero 
otherwise. Country domicile fixed effects are included. IEF is Islamic equity fund, CEF is conventional equity fund, SRI is 
socially responsible investment fund, and REF is religious equity fund. (IEF-CEF), (IEF-SRI), and (IEF-REF) are the return 
difference portfolios. P-values are in parentheses using clustered standard errors by fund regional orientation. The symbols ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Number of funds = 372 for specifications (1), (3), (5), 
and (7); Number of funds = 232 for specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8).  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(MSCI Islamic - MSCI AC) -0.00078 0.00006 -0.00125 -0.00130 *
(0.306) (0.957) (0.432) (0.064)
(MSCI Islamic -  DJ Islamic) 0.00031 0.00055 ** 0.00066 0.00077
(0.196) (0.023) (0.182) (0.112)
No Accounting Screens -0.00127 0.00212 -0.00078 0.00836 ***
(0.772) (0.544) (0.883) (0.009)
(No Accounting Screens)2 0.00020 -0.00035 0.00011 -0.00148 **
(0.749) (0.604) (0.894) (0.018)
D_Employ Total Assets -0.00090 -0.00124 -0.00354 -0.00499
(0.752) (0.729) (0.432) (0.103)
D_Employ One-Third Threshold -0.00410 0.00106 -0.00201 -0.00427
(0.188) (0.769) (0.552) (0.257)
Asian Financial Crisis -0.08683 *** -0.11024 *** 0.01450 -0.00875 -0.06481 *** -0.11486 *** 0.09626 *** 0.09972 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.387) (0.603) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
The 2000.dotcom Crisis -0.00204 -0.00182 0.00227 0.00507 -0.00231 ** 0.00054 -0.01082 *** -0.00755 ***
(0.342) (0.516) (0.345) (0.104) (0.026) (0.836) (0.000) (0.001)
Global Financial Crisis -0.00192 ** -0.00154 0.00339 *** 0.00409 *** -0.00004 -0.00022 -0.00187 * -0.00263 *
(0.012) (0.299) (0.006) (0.008) (0.965) (0.852) (0.093) (0.089)
Log(Size) 0.00076 * 0.00090 ** 0.00068 0.00036 0.00034 0.00095 ** 0.00082 * 0.00033
(0.092) (0.024) (0.260) (0.219) (0.645) (0.035) (0.058) (0.394)
Log(Age) -0.00154 *** -0.00120 *** 0.00075 ** 0.00005 -0.00165 * -0.00148 * -0.00248 ** -0.00097
(0.000) (0.001) (0.031) (0.893) (0.063) (0.089) (0.043) (0.290)
Management Fees -0.00037 -0.00022 0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00044 -0.00101 0.00080 0.00132
(0.475) (0.838) (0.939) (0.963) (0.629) (0.499) (0.104) (0.272)
Purification Fees -0.00166 ** -0.00136 *** 0.00003 0.00005 0.00001 -0.00020 -0.00111 ** -0.00146 ***
(0.035) (0.002) (0.965) (0.957) (0.990) (0.783) (0.016) (0.000)
Islamic Investment Company 0.00073 -0.00237 0.00251 *** 0.00044 0.00051 0.00083 0.00527 *** 0.00287
(0.694) (0.424) (0.001) (0.800) (0.476) (0.480) (0.001) (0.206)
Constant 0.01057 *** 0.01433 0.00743 *** 0.00520 0.01186 *** 0.01290 0.00904 *** -0.00407
(0.000) (0.133) (0.000) (0.357) (0.001) (0.290) (0.010) (0.559)
Number of obs     21700 12559 20925 12076 20764 12059 20149 11462
R-Sqr 0.064 0.090 0.014 0.008 0.035 0.082 0.066 0.063
IEF IEF-CEF IEF-SRI IEF-REF
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Table 8 
Panel regressions of IEF performance and holdings-based ethical screening intensity 
Portfolio performance is measured by subtracting monthly realized return from the expected return as per Fama and French’s 
three-factor model. Full Compliance is the fraction of fund holdings passing both the business and accounting screens of MSCI 
Islamic. Debt Ratio Compliance is the fraction of fund holdings passing the total debt/total assets<1/3 screen. Asian Financial Crisis, 
The 2000.dotcom Crisis, and Global Financial Crisis take the value of 1 for each of the economic crises and zero otherwise. Size is the 
fund’s total assets under management (in USD million); Age is measured from the inception date to the test date (in months); 
Purification Fees (%) is the fund’s non-compliant income over net assets as reported in the annual report; and Islamic Investment 
Company equals one if the fund is managed by an Islamic investment company and zero otherwise. Country domicile fixed effects 
are included. IEF is Islamic equity fund, CEF is conventional equity fund, SRI is socially responsible investment fund, and REF 
is religious equity fund. (IEF-CEF), (IEF-SRI), and (IEF-REF) are the return difference portfolios. P-values are in parentheses 
using clustered standard errors by fund regional orientation. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Number of funds = 125. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full Compliance -0.01368 -0.03015 * -0.01278 -0.03549 **
(0.405) (0.063) (0.115) (0.030)
Full Compliance 2 0.00817 0.04736 0.01681 0.02443
(0.636) (0.117) (0.151) (0.223)
Debt Ratio Compliance -0.01097 -0.04027 -0.02060 * -0.02789 **
(0.528) (0.165) (0.087) (0.029)
Debt Ratio Compliance 2 0.00354 0.04476 0.01874 0.00958
(0.881) (0.248) (0.312) (0.665)
Asian Financial Crisis -0.10036 *** -0.10051 *** 0.02018 0.02036 -0.08970 *** -0.08979 *** 0.12255 *** 0.12217 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.296) (0.298) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
The 2000.dotcom Crisis -0.00494 *** -0.00488 *** -0.00005 0.00017 -0.00494 * -0.00482 * -0.01321 *** -0.01307 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.980) (0.914) (0.073) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000)
Global Financial Crisis -0.00046 -0.00047 0.00363 ** 0.00353 * 0.00321 *** 0.00320 ** -0.00107 -0.00104
(0.679) (0.698) (0.039) (0.061) (0.009) (0.014) (0.325) (0.395)
Log(Size) 0.00061 0.00066 * 0.00129 ** 0.00114 *** 0.00094 0.00088 * 0.00030 0.00046
(0.237) (0.087) (0.032) (0.005) (0.129) (0.073) (0.550) (0.201)
Log(Age) -0.00085 *** -0.00088 *** 0.00037 0.00046 -0.00117 -0.00119 -0.00159 -0.00166
(0.000) (0.000) (0.547) (0.467) (0.217) (0.189) (0.113) (0.137)
Management Fees 0.00006 0.00025 -0.00192 -0.00142 -0.00240 ** -0.00200 0.00364 *** 0.00396 ***
(0.973) (0.895) (0.454) (0.606) (0.049) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000)
Purification Fees -0.00474 -0.00440 0.01393 *** 0.01460 *** 0.00994 ** 0.01035 ** 0.00331 0.00422
(0.601) (0.632) (0.001) (0.001) (0.040) (0.041) (0.589) (0.520)
Islamic Investment Company 0.01192 ** 0.01194 ** 0.01182 ** 0.01150 ** 0.00964 *** 0.00922 *** 0.01671 *** 0.01647 ***
(0.027) (0.016) (0.048) (0.029) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
Constant -0.00074 0.00628 -0.00446 -0.00929 -0.00365 -0.00206 -0.00434 0.01299
(0.847) (0.589) (0.329) (0.535) (0.267) (0.835) (0.294) (0.367)
Number of obs     8689 8689 8404 8404 8462 8462 8174 8174
R-Sqr 0.109 0.109 0.025 0.026 0.073 0.073 0.111 0.111
IEF IEF-CEF IEF-SRI IEF-REF
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Table 9 
Panel regressions of Islamic index performance and ethical screening intensity 
The sample of Islamic indexes is selected based on Islamic fund regional orientation. There are nine regional and nine country (domestic) Islamic indexes which follow the screening methodology of 
MSCI Islamic, Dow Jones Islamic, FTSE Shariah, and FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS Shariah. Portfolio performance is measured by subtracting monthly realized return from the expected return from 
the Fama and French’s three-factor model. Ethical screening intensity is proxied by No Accounting Screens, the number of accounting screens employed by Islamic indexes; D_Employ Total Assets, which 
equals one if the index discloses using total assets in the denominator of accounting screens and zero otherwise; D_Employ One-Third Threshold, which equals one if the index discloses using one-third as 
the minimum threshold in the accounting screens and zero otherwise; and D_ Purification Fees which equals one if the index discloses using dividend purification ratio. Asian Financial Crisis, The 
2000.dotcom Crisis, and Global Financial Crisis take the value of 1 for each of the economic crises and zero otherwise. Asian Financial Crisis and D_Employ Total Assets are omitted because of collinearity. 
Islamic is Islamic equity index, Conventional is conventional equity index, SRI is socially responsible investment equity index, and Religious is religious equity index. (Islamic-Conventional), (Islamic-
SRI), and (Islamic-Religious) are the return difference portfolios. P-values are in parentheses using clustered standard errors by fund regional orientation. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No Accounting Screens -0.00389 *** 0.00738 *** -0.01352 *** -0.00247 **
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024)
(No Accounting Screens) 2 0.00137 *** -0.00161 *** 0.00240 *** 0.00090 ***  
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
D_Employ One-Third Threshold -0.00523 *** 0.00376 *** -0.00349 *** -0.00352 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
D_Purification Fees -0.00295 *** -0.00236 ** 0.00130 *** 0.00113 *** 0.00021 -0.00010 0.00010 0.00051
(0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.000) (0.769) (0.877) (0.867) (0.311)
The 2000.dotcom Crisis -0.00625 *** -0.00660 *** -0.00809 *** -0.00801 *** -0.00878 ** -0.00860 *** -0.00431 -0.00455
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.009) (0.217) (0.214)
Global Financial Crisis -0.00393 -0.00384 0.00237 *** 0.00235 *** 0.00684 *** 0.00679 *** 0.00700 *** 0.00707 ***
(0.108) (0.113) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.00219 0.00781 *** -0.00931 *** -0.00533 *** 0.01723 *** 0.00185 -0.00293 *** 0.00111
(0.234) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.132) (0.009) (0.298)
Number of obs     1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269
R-Sqr 0.234 0.082 0.391 0.365 0.239 0.163 0.307 0.202
Islamic Islamic - Conventional Islamic - SRI Islamic - Religious
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